

Security Testing with Static and Dynamic Analysis

Barry Jaspan Drupalcon Szeged 2008

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State of web security

- During this talk, 7
 Drupal sites will launch
- All of them are insecure
- 100% of the other dynamic sites you use are insecure, too
 - Including your bank
- Programmers will never stop making security mistakes
- We're doomed





Questions?

Barry Jaspan Acquia, Inc. barry.jaspan@acquia.com

Identifying problems



- Reacting to attacks
 - Ineffective: the attacker may not reveal himself
 - Stressful: attacks tend to cause panic
 - Unreliable: you may not find the hole
 - Extremely undesirable: this is NOT how you want to discover a problem
 - Unavoidable: realistically, this will happen

Identifying problems



- Human security audits
 - Effective: security specialists are good at their job
 - Expensive: they know it
 - Unreliable: no one ever finds all the problems
 - Impractical: there is too much code, changing too quickly
 - Irreplaceable: human analysis will ALWAYS be required

Identifying problems



- Automated security testing
 - Effective: proven to catch many problems
 - Inexpensive: software is cheaper than people
 - Unreliable: no tool ever finds all the problems
- All approaches are unreliable!
 - Best bet is to combine as many as possible
- Types of automatic testing
 - White box: uses insider access to the source
 - Black box: remote penetration testing
 - This talk is about white-box testing

Best ways to hurt yourself

- Winner! Insufficiently validated input
 - XSS
 - SQLi
 - CSRF
- Runners up
 - Logic errors
 - Security model flaws
 - Countless others
- Automated testing is quite effective for unvalidated input



Data tainting



- "Taint" data based on source (not content)
 - \$_GET, \$_POST, \$_SERVER, command line...
- Propagate taint

```
$foo = $_GET[`foo']; // $foo is tainted
$bar = `bar'; // $bar is not tainted
$mix = $foo . $bar; // $mix is tainted
```

```
myfunc($mix);
function myfunc($arg) { /* $arg is tainted */ }
```

• Define de-tainters and sinks which reject taint


echo \$bar; // okay
echo \$mix; // error; echo rejects taint
echo check_plain(\$mix); // okay; check_plain de-taints

• Rules define taint types, sources, and sinks



Static Analysis

- Simple example: Coder module
- Study source without running it
- Consider all possible control paths
- Use data flow analysis to track tainted data
- Use rules to find bugs
- Completeness is impossible; so what?
- False positives occur



Static Analysis: Fortify SCA


Source:	bootstrap.inc:290 Read \$_SERVER['HTTP_HOST']()
288	<pre>\$confdir = 'sites';</pre>
289	<pre>\$uri = explode('/', \$_SERVER['SCRIPT_NAME'] ? \$_SERVER['SCRIPT_NAME'] : \$_SERVER['SCRIPT_FILENAME']);</pre>
290	<pre>\$server = explode('.', implode('.', array_reverse(explode(':', rtrim(\$_SERVER['HTTP_HOST'], '.')))));</pre>
291	for $(\$i = count(\$uri) - 1; \$i > 0; \$i)$ {
292	for $(\$j = count(\$server); \$j > 0; \$j)$ {
Sink:	file.inc:141 mkdir()
139	// Check if directory exists.
140	<pre>if (!is_directory)) {</pre>
141	if ((\$mode & FILE_CREATE_DIRECTORY) && @mkdir(\$directory)) {
142	<pre>@chmod(\$directory, 0775); // Necessary for non-webserver users.</pre>
143	}

- \$base_path based on HTTP_HOST
- Defined in bootstrap, passed to file.inc
- Static analysis identifies the flow
- False positive, but just barely

Dynamic Analysis

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- Operates during execution
- Consider control paths actually taken
- Tracks taint in interpreter
- False positives are unlikely
- PHP has no native support; patched interpreter required



Tainting the database



- Is data from the database tainted or not?
 - user.email: validated pre-write, so it's safe
 - node.title: validated post-read, so it's not safe
- Per-column taint information in schema
 - On read, set taint property on any data coming from a tainted column
 - On write, verify lack of taint on any data going to a tainted column
 - Preserves taint properties across the database
- Requires (?) dynamic, not static, analysis

Taint Drupal



- Based on Taint PHP by Wietse Venema
 - Defines fixed set of taint bits
 - TC_HTML, _SQL, _PCRE, ..., _ALL
 - Taint-enables a subset of PHP and ext functions
- database.taintmysqli.inc does db tainting
- Schema changes:

```
function taint_schema_alter($schema) {
    // title contains raw text from the user
    $schema[`node'][`fields'][`title'][`taint'] =
    TC_ALL;
    // message can contain the path but must be
    // check_plain()ed before INSERT
    $schema[`watchdog'][`fields'][`message'][`taint'] =
    TC_ALL & ~TC_HTML;
    }
}
```

Taint Drupal: Node title



• This bug was in Drupal 6.0:

• Taint Drupal catches it automatically:



Taint Drupal: Simpletests



- Taint Drupal is integrated with Simpletest
 - Taint-checks all covered code paths automatically
 - Logs all taint errors as Fails
 - Simulated penetration testing not needed
 - Eventually, this can wipe out XSS, SQLi, and more
 - ... especially if used in production with hard failures

Taint Drupal: Status

- acquia
- Requires patched & re-built PHP interpreter
- Taint PHP is experimental and incomplete
 - Further work may require a fork
- Taint Drupal is also incomplete
 - Needs taint settings for columns of every table in the schema (core and contrib)
 - Assumes TC_NONE unless told otherwise, so you can "page in" taint bits as you get false errors
- Not yet publicly available



Demo!

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Questions? (for real this time)

Barry Jaspan Acquia, Inc. barry.jaspan@acquia.com